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Employment effects of CAP payments in the UK non-farm economy 
M Rizov, S Davidova, A Bailey 
Contributed Paper presented at the 91st UK AES  Conference, Dublin 
 
This paper investigates the effect of the CAP payments on the indirectly generated non-farm 
jobs and whether there are differences in the effect according to business location - rural or 
urban - and according to CAP measures, in particular Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. A 
microeconomic approach is employed, based on company data from FAME dataset combined 
with detailed subsidies data from DEFRA. The focus is on employment in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), which are central for job creation. The generalised method of 
moments (GMM) is used to estimate the effect of CAP payments on both the level and growth 
of employment. The results suggest positive net spillovers of CAP payments to non-farm 
employment. Although the magnitude of the effect is small, it is economically significant. 
Relative to Pillar 2, Pillar 1 payments have a stronger positive effect. As expected, the non-
farm employment effect is particularly important for rural SMEs.  
 
1 Introduction 
This paper investigates WKHFRQWULEXWLRQLIDQ\RIWKH(8¶V&RPPRQ$JULFXOWXUDO3ROLF\
(CAP) payments to non-farm sector employment in both rural and urban areas in the UK 
through its direct and indirect effects on agriculture¶V up- and downstream industries, and the 
economic diversification of rural areas. In recent years, given the difficult recovery from the 
2008 economic and financial crisis, the provision of employment is of primary interest to 
policy makers and to millions of UK citizens. Additionally, whatever the UK package for 
Brexit will be, it is almost certain that the UK will leave the CAP and the ways agriculture is 
supported will change. Naturally, majority of existing studies are concerned with the effects 
of the forthcoming changes on agriculture but it is also useful to have some indications of the 
possible benefits or losses beyond farming by investigating the inter-industry spillovers of the 
CAP payments on non-farm employment.  
For decades, the CAP payments have tried to maintain the level of agricultural 
employment, or at least to slow down its decline as a result of technical and structural change. 
In the face of these forces, the CAP could hardly have further impact in the direction of job 
creation or even job maintenance in primary agriculture. However, the CAP payments may 
have inter-industry spillovers on non-farm employment which are often not-accounted for.  
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Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of the CAP 
payments on the indirectly generated non-farm jobs. In particular, the study focuses on three 
key questions: (i) whether CAP payments are positively associated with non-farm 
employment; (ii) whether there are differences in the effect according to business location - 
rural or urban; and (iii) whether different CAP payments have different employment effects, 
i.e. Pillar 1 direct payments and Pillar 2 rural development payments. 
Most previous CAP and employment research has focused on the CAP¶V impact on 
agricultural and rural jobs, often in an EU regionalised framework (for example, Petrick and 
Zier, 2011; 2012; Olper et al., 2014). Other studies have addressed only the impact of rural 
development payments under Pillar 2 (e.g. Mattas et al., 2011). A recent report for the 
European Parliament Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) 
concerning the role of CAP in creation of rural jobs has reviewed 53 studies. All of these 
studies were agri-centred - they were either focused on agriculture and rural jobs, or on 
labour migration out of agriculture (EP, 2016). One notable exception is the paper by 
Blomquist and Nordin (2013), who employed a macroeconomic approach and estimated the 
open-economy relative multiplier of agricultural subsidies in Sweden, thus capturing the 
&$3¶VLPSDFWon employment beyond agriculture. The present paper tries to fill the gap in 
the literature and to stimulate a broader debate about the wider, inter-industry employment 
effects of the CAP. 
The paper employs a micro approach, based on company data extracted from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) dataset of Bureau van Dijk combined with detailed 
subsidies data extracted from Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
CAP Payments database. Only the effects on employment in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are analysed. SMEs are defined by the UK Government and the EU as 
businesses with less than 250 employees. The rationale to focus on SMEs is based on two 
considerations. First, at the beginning of 2013, SMEs represented over 99 per cent of all 
private-sector businesses in the UK, accounting for 59.3 per cent of private-sector 
employment and for 48.1 per cent of private-sector turnover (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2013). They are also central to job creation as recognised by the UK 
government. Second, as mentioned above, one of the objectives of the study is to investigate 
whether there are different effects of CAP payments on employment in rural and urban non-
farm businesses. Rural businesses are mainly SMEs, and comparisons with large companies 




monopolistic competition model with delays in adjustment in output price, employment, and 
capacity. The generalised method of moments (GMM) is used to estimate the effect of the 
CAP payments on both the level and the growth of employment. The results suggest positive 
net spillovers of CAP payments, although the magnitude of coefficients is rather small. 
Looking at different CAP measures, relative to other CAP expenditure, Pillar 1 direct 
payments have a strong statistically significant effect on the level of employment but not on 
the employment growth. As expected, the CAP effect on employment is mostly concentrated 
in rural SMEs. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a short 
overview of the CAP subsidies in the UK and their distribution by constituent country. 
Section 3 details the theoretical framework, and section 4 presents the data and the estimation 
strategy. Section 5 presents the results while section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of 
policy implications. 
 
2 The evolution of CAP subsidies and the implications for employment 
The period covered in the empirical analysis ranges from 2008, the year of the CAP Health 
Check by the European Commission, to 2014 - WKHILUVWWUDQVLWLRQDO\HDURIWKHµQHZ¶&$3IRU
the period 2014-2020. The presentation of the implementation of different CAP measures in 
the UK is limited to the period analysed, since a wider general discussion of the CAP is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
The Health Check of 2008 introduced the main policy changes before implementation 
of the most recent CAP reform for the period 2014-2020 (Allen et al., 2014). It did not 
change the fundamental decisions taken in the 2003 CAP reform, i.e. the introduction of a 
decoupled (from production) Single Farm Payment (SFP) to farmers, conditional on 
environmental and other cross-compliance requirements, and keeping the land in Good 
Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAEC), as the main feature of Pillar 1. The 
Health Check moved slightly further in the direction mapped by the 2003 CAP reform, i.e. it 
decreased the remaining coupled payments, increased modulation of funds from Pillar 1 to 
Pillar 2, and removed arable land set-aside. It also provided the EU Member States (MSs) 
with flexible possibilities to assist sub-sectors of agriculture with special problems, the so-
called Article 68 measures. 
From theoretical viewpoint, given existing legislation, the CAP payments can affect 
non-farm employment both through a production and a consumption effect. In the 2003 
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Council Regulations establishing the rules for direct support schemes, the SFP scheme was 
treated as income support (OJ, 21/10/2003). The SFP is paid to farmers, the latter defined as 
natural or legal persons, or groups of such persons. Although in theory decoupled, the SFP 
may be invested in farm production and thus increase or maintain the employment in 
agriculture or up- and downstream industries. Bhaskar and Beghin (2007) reviewed a number 
of studies on the coupling mechanisms of decoupled payments. Some of these mechanisms 
include wealth and insurance effects that might increase the use of inputs and affect the 
increase in output; the effect on investment decisions as farmers could save and invest more; 
and increased liquidity of credit-constrained households. 
The decoupled income support to farmers can also have a complex impact on the 
income-leisure trade-off and labour allocation decisions to work on- or off-farm. It might also 
increase savings and/or the contemporaneous consumption of farm households of non-farm 
goods and services as SFP adds to the overall household purchasing power. The effect in 
WHUPVRIIDUPHUV¶KRXVHKROGLQFRPHH[SHQGLWXUHis generated mainly in rural areas but it may 
or may not correlate with increased employment in those areas, taking into account purchases 
at a distance and services provided from urban areas. Additionally, the increase of the overall 
purchasing power in rural areas depends on how much of the CAP payments remain with the 
farm households. Higher land rent, which is a well-known consequence of direct payments, 
leaks out to landowners who may not live in the locality. 1 
. To conclude, there are two main channels through which CAP SFP may affect non-
agricultural employment ± through its effect on consumption as a really decoupled payment, 
and through its coupled effect on farm investments and output level. Both these channels 
would lead to expansion in the demand that the non-farm sector firms face.  
Concerning Rural Development (RD) measures in Pillar 2, there are a wide range of 
channels through which payments can affect non-farm employment. Rizov (2004) studied the 
effect of CAP on the organisation and performance of rural communities since the 
introduction of Pillar 2 in 1999. He developed a theoretical model of private provision of 
public goods where RD payments lead to diversification of the economic activities in rural 
areas which, in turn, enhances the sustainability of the local economy. While his focus is 
mainly on formally defining the conditions under which the CAP income transfers can 
                                                          
1
 A consequence of the appropriation of a high share of payments by the landowners means that the local 
multiplier effect of CAP Pillar 1 payments is likely to appear lower in those areas where there is a high 
proportion of rented land, as higher rents leak out to landowners who do not always live in the same locality; 
thus, the true effect is likely to be larger. Furthermore, while the presence of leakages is an important 
consideration, which generally DSSOLHVWRIDUPHUV¶SXUFKDVLQJSRZHUDQGH[SHQGLWXUHRXUDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUN
is built on the idea of economy-wide spillovers and our data capture the economy-wide effects. 
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improve, or otherwise, rural community development, he does not explicitly address the 
complementary employment effects. However, the RD measures may create employment 
both within the local rural community and beyond, in the urban areas, thus illustrating the 
general interdependency of rural and urban areas. The first order effects, similarly to Pillar 1, 
are due to the fact that there is a flow of funds into some rural households which increases 
their purchasing power. Additionally, e.g. RD measures for investments in physical assets - 
farm modernisation, infrastructure, energy-saving technologies - may influence employment 
in research and development, construction, technical services, etc. Business start-up aid for 
young farmers and for non-farm enterprises, as well as village renewal support, can have a 
direct effect on employment in rural and surrounding urban areas. Support to enhance 
biodiversity and the provision of higher-value ecosystem services may help to create non-
farm jobs in rural tourism and associated services. Policy developments within the food 
system, e.g. short food chains, organic box trade, and traceability, can produce employment 
growth along the entire agri-food supply chain.  
However, the form and the level of CAP payments vary across the UK. Table 1 
presents some indicators that exemplify the striking differences in agricultural sectors across 
its four constituent countries.  
- Table 1 here ± 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) payments in England are less important than in the other three 
countries where 70 per cent and more of the agricultural area is designated as LFA. Around 
half of the land area in England is under crops, whilst in the other countries it is either 
predominantly grass land (Northern Ireland and Wales) or rough grazing (Scotland). These 
production patterns, together with farm size and productivity effects, has led to a different 
reliance on subsidies: the lowest in England at 52 per cent of the total income from farming, 
and highest in Wales at 142 per cent (Allen et al., 2014).2 
Table 2 presents in more detail the CAP payments by Pillar in the UK and the 
constituent countries since 2010 ± the first year available which falls within the period of 
analysis in this paper. The UK constituent countries took different implementation decisions 
on the decoupled direct payment (SFP) - Scotland and Wales introduced the SFP on a 
historical basis, England opted for a dynamic hybrid version, and Northern Ireland for a static 
hybrid one.  
                                                          
2
 Total income from farming is the return on own labour, capital and management input of all those with an 
entrepreneurial involvement in farming, generally farmers and partners. It is measured at sectoral level and 
represents the net value added at factor cost minus the compensation of employees, rent and interest. 
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- Table 2 here ± 
 
3 Theoretical framework: firm employment function 
The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the CAP payment impact on employment in 
the non-farm economy. Therefore, the focus here is not on developing a fully-fledged 
theoretical model of all possible channels of impact but rather it is on outlining a theoretical 
framework to motivate an appropriate estimating specification and the interpretation of 
results. The theoretical framework employed LVEDVHGRQ6PROQ\¶V8) monopolistic 
competition model with delays in adjustment in price, employment, and capacity.3 The 
framework leads to a theoretically motivated firm employment (demand) function. 
Furthermore, the framework is suitable for analysing spillover effects because it is based on 
realistic assumptions for the timing of decisions, clearly distinguishing between short-, 
medium-, and long-run. The timing assumptions are as follows. In the short run, only output 
is endogenous. Employment and prices adjust in the medium run, with a delay with respect to 
demand and cost changes, thus under uncertainty about demand. Capacities and the 
production technology are predetermined for the price and employment adjustment process, 
and react only in the long run.  
The assumption about delays in the reduction of employment can be justified by 
legal and contractual periods of notice; there often are also substantial severance costs. In 
addition, reputational losses for firms in the case of frequent dismissals tend to restrict the 
downward adjustment of the labour force to normal separations, i.e. resignations and 
retirements. Delays in the upward adjustment of the labour force involve search, screening 
and training time. A delayed adjustment of prices corresponds to the assumption of price 
tags and menu cost. Importantly, even a short delay between the decision to change 
employment and/or the price and the realisation of a demand shock can introduce 
considerable uncertainty in adjustment for the firm. The dynamic decision problem of the 
firm can be reduced to a sequence of static decision models which are solved stepwise.  
We start by specifying a log-linear demand function IRUWKHILUP¶VSURGXFW(lnD) that 
allows us to distinguish between the effects of price elasticity of demand, demand shifts, and 
demand uncertainty: 
                                                          
3
 6PROQ\¶VPRGHOLVUHODWHGWRWKHIDPLO\RIVRFDOOHGSutty-clay models which have a long history in the 
growth and business cycle literature with micro foundations (Johansen 1959; Solow 1962; Phelps 1963; 
Sheshinski 1967; Cass and Stiglitz 1969; Bresnahan and Ramey 1994; Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power 1999; 




 ݈݊ܦ ൌ ߟǤ ݈݊݌ ൅ ݈ܼ݊ ൅ ߝǡܧሺߝሻ ൌ  ?ǡܸܽݎሺߝሻ ൌ ߪଶǤ    (1) 
 
In equation (1), D is negatively associated with price, p, with constant elasticity Ș, Z is a 
vector of exogenous or predetermined demand measures, such as aggregate industry demand ܦഥ and demand shifters induced by market factors or policy, and the error term İ (with zero 
expected mean) captures the realised value of the demand shock which is not known at the 
time of the price and employment decision. The time and firm indexes are omitted for 
notational convenience. 
In this paper the information content of the Z-vector in the demand function is 
extended with the CAP expenditure indicators.4 Following the discussion in the previous 
section and findings in the limited literature on the impact of CAP subsidies on regional 
development (Vatn, 2002; Peterson et al., 2002; Rizov, 2004; 2005), we argue that the inter-
sectoral spillovers and the local economy diversification effects of subsidies are associated 
with the expansion of aggregate demand that non-farm sector firms face.5 This first-order, 
demand effect is likely to impact significantly on non-farm sector firm employment.6   
According to equation (1), another effect of CAP subsidies on non-farm firm demand 
and employment could occur through the volatility of demand captured by the variance of 
demand ı2; such subsidies would generally reduce volatility of demand, and thus smooth 
employment adjustments. Following this argument, while subsidies would not affect the 
mean of İ they may affect ı. 
To complete the model, we specify firm supply (S) function determined by a short-run 
production function with capital K and labour L as inputs: 
 ܵ ൌ ሺ ௄ܻǡ ௅ܻሻ ൌ ሺߨ௄Ǥ ܭǡ ߨ௅ Ǥ ܮሻǡ      (2) 
 
                                                          
4
 The extension of the demand equation (1) with CAP expenditure information partially addresses omitted 
variables concerns when specifying an estimating equation. To further deal with omitted variable concerns at the 
estimation stage we also use sets of location, industry, and time dummies.  
5
 The diversification of the local economy driven by CAP payments can be seen as a sustainable development 
effect, considering that a diversified local economy would be more resilient to economic shocks (Barkley, 1995; 
Stavins et al., 2003).  
6
 There could also be a second-order, supply effect derived through different channels such as changes in 
competition and agglomeration in the upstream and/or downstream industries, but our focus here is on the first-
order (dominant) demand effect. The second-order supply effect is controlled for in the estimation stage by firm 
characteristics such as size, age, and cost-per-employee, which is also a measure of productivity. 
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where YK is capacity, YL is the employment constraint, and ʌK, ʌL are the productivities of 
capital and labour respectively. In the short run, output Y is determined as the minimum of 
supply and demand: 
 ܻ ൌ ሺܵǡ ܦሻǤ         (3) 
 
The medium-run optimisation problem is 
 ௣ǡ௅ ݌Ǥ ܧሺܻሻ െ ݓǤ ܮ െ ܿǤ ܭǡ        (4) 
 
subject to equations (1) and (2), where E is the expectation operator. Wage costs w and user 
costs of capital c are treated as exogenous at the firm level. There are two relevant 
optimization scenarios where capacity is, or is not, binding on decisions.7 In the case of 
capacity constraint, employment is determined from the capacity. No more workers will be 
hired than can be employed with the predetermined capital stock. Supply and employment 
result from:  
 ܵ ൌ ௅ܻ ൌ ௄ܻǡܮሺ ௄ܻሻ ൌ ௒గ಼ಽ Ǥ        (5) 
 
The optimal price depends on capacities, expected demand shifts, demand uncertainty and 
competition. In the capacity-constrained scenario, the adjustment of employment is inhibited, 
and the whole adjustment with respect to expected demand shifts falls on the price. The 
implication is that level of employment will remain unchanged. 
In the case of unconstrained capacity, which is the most likely case in the UK market 
economy, optimal employment and price are jointly determined by setting marginal costs of 
employment, i.e. the wage rate w, equal to the marginal revenue. The latter is determined as 
the price, multiplied by the productivity of labour, and multiplied by the probability that the 
additional output can be sold, i.e. that demand exceeds supply:  
 
                                                          
7
 For completeness, we point out a third scenario in which labour supply is constrained, i.e., the firm does not 
have sufficient number of applicants. In this case, optimal employment is determined by the (exogenous) labour 
supply which in turn may depend on local market conditions, and regional and national policies including the 
CAP and movement of labour laws. Given the setup of our framework, the labour supply constraint is 
predetermined in short and medium runs. Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis we use locational controls such 
as the rural-urban dummy and clustering at constituent country level, as well as sets of time and industry 
dummies which proxy for possible exogenous labour supply constraints.  
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݌ሺݓሻǤ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺ ௅ܻ ൏ ܦሻǤ ߨ௅ െ ݓ ൌ  ?Ǥ       (6) 
 
The optimal price is determined by unit labour costs ݓȀߨ௅, and the mark-up is equal to the 
probability of a supply constraint on the goods market. This probability is determined by the 
price elasticity of demand and demand uncertainty, i.e. the optimal price is independent of 
expected demand shifts as set out in equation (1). 
Optimal supply and employment are derived from 
 ܵ ൌ ௅ܻሺݓሻ ൌ ߟǤ ݈݊݌ሺݓሻ ൅ ݈ܼ݊ ൅ ߝҧሺߟǡ ߪሻǡ      (7a) ܮሺݓሻ ൌ ௒ಽሺ௪ሻగಽ ǡ          (7b) 
 
where ߝҧሺߟǡ ߪሻ is the value of the demand shock which distinguishes the supply-constrained 
regime from the demand-constrained regime.8 Demand shifts induced by the expansion of 
demand due to the spillovers and diversification effect of CAP payments lead to growth in 
employment. An immediate adjustment of employment is contained as the limiting case with 
ıĺ. Introducing uncertainty reduces the expected utilisation of employment, and has the 
same effect on prices and employment as higher variable costs. Thus, uncertainty reduces 
optimal employment and increases the price through the costs of underutilisation of 
employment. However, as argued earlier, if CAP payments reduce uncertainty, then there will 
be less underutilisation of labour and employment would relatively rise.  
Assuming log-normal distribution of İ which follows from equation (1), equation 
(7b) can be written in a log-linear form which is the basis of the estimating specifications in 
this study: 
 ݈݊ܮ ൌ െ݈݊ߨ௅ ൅ ߟǤ ݈݊݌ሺݓሻ ൅ ݈ܼ݊ ൅ ߝҧሺߟǡ ߪሻǤ       (8) 
 
Thus, employment is a function of CAP payments as well as labour productivity, aggregate 
market demand, firm demand variance, firm-specific characteristics such as size, measured 
by total assets, and age. In the estimating specifications, we include industry, location (rural-
urban) and time dummy controls capturing the effects of price elasticity of demand and 
market structure.  
                                                          
8
 Note that ߝҧ ൌ ݈݊ܵ െ ܮ݊ܦ and its optimal value depends only on Ș and on the parameters of the probability 
density function (pdf) of ߝǤഥ A pdf of ߝ ҧ which is completely characterised by its expected value and variance can 
be written as ߝ ҧሺߟǡ ߪሻǤ  
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The framework outlined above is useful for the analysis of employment adjustment 
and price rigidities during the business cycle in general, and of the implications of the CAP 
payments in particular. Suppose that the stochastic process generating demand shocks is 
auto-correlated, i.e. firms expect that demand shocks are persistent. Then, unexpected 
demand shocks affect the utilisation of labour and capital contemporaneously. If the actual 
utilisation differs from the optimum, employment and/or prices adjust as the adjustment 
depends on the availability of capacity. In the case of a capacity constraint (in boom 
periods), employment would remain unchanged, and the firm would adjust the price. With a 
sufficient capacity (in recession periods), the firm would adjust employment, and the price 
would remain unchanged. CAP payments resulting in sustained higher demand and 
smoothing the demand fluctuations thus lead to larger firm capacities and more 
employment; in the long run they would also lower the probability of demand shocks hitting 
the capacity (supply constraint).  
The framework yields a further hypothesis about the effects of the price elasticity of 
demand on employment and price adjustment. In the case of demand shocks, a low price 
elasticity of demand ȁߟȁ should favour employment adjustments against price adjustments.9 
Finally, another set of potential hypotheses is on the relationship between employment 
adjustment and firm size. First, scale economies in larger firms should reduce production 
costs which permit them to set lower prices, and increase output and employment. Second, 
adjustment costs for prices and employment might differ according to firm size due to 
technology specificity. Third, larger firms have larger market shares, which should be 
associated with less competition and less uncertainty about demand. Considering all these 
potential effects makes it theoretically ambiguous whether large firms relatively increase 
employment, and therefore this is a question for the empirical analysis. 
 
4 Data and estimation strategy 
The firm employment function formulated in equation (8) was estimated using the FAME 
data set of Bureau van Dijk combined with detailed subsidies data extracted from the DEFRA 
CAP Payments database. FAME covers all firms filed at Companies House in the UK, and 
includes information on detailed unconsolidated financial statements, employment, location 
by post code, and activity description. The data used in the analysis contains annual records 
on over 2 million firms over the period 2008±2014. The geographic distribution of the firms 
                                                          
9
 Hypotheses for the analysis of effects of competition on employment and price adjustments could also be 
formulated but they are beyond the purposes of the analysis here. 
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in the dataset which are available for analysis is presented in Figure 1. The coverage of the 
data compared with the aggregate statistics reported by the UK Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) is very good as regards sales (89 per cent) and employment (90 per cent).  
- Figure 1 ± 
While partially available for all years from 2006 to 2014, the CAP subsidy data is not 
complete for some years. This is to a great extent a result of amendments to Commission 
Regulation (EC259/2008). Following a decision of the European Court of Justice, for some 
years after 2008 the Commission removed the requirement to publish subsidy payment data 
on farming individuals and partnerships, though MSs were still obliged to publish data on 
legal entities. In 2013, the Commission introduced new rules for transparency, including both 
individuals and all legal entities. The only exception was for very small beneficiaries who 
UHFHLYHOHVVWKDQ¼LQWRWDOVXEVLG\HTXLYDOHQWWRLQDQGLQ; 
their names were withheld and replaced by a code number. Therefore, the workable dataset 
available for this study covers four years: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The CAP payment 
information comprises the amount of total subsidy and its three components: common market 
organisation (CMO) and direct payments (DP) or aka single farm payment (SFP) made under 
&$3¶V3LOODU, and rural development (RD) payments made under Pillar 2. The geographic 
distribution of the annual CAP payments in the dataset is presented in Figure 2 
- Figure 2 ± 
The industry sectors are identified on the basis of the 2007 UK Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) at the 4-digit level. Given the large number of 4-digit industries, on 
several occasions, for definition of specific variables the more aggregated 2-digit codes were 
used. All nominal monetary variables were converted into real values by deflating with the 
appropriate ONS industry deflators at 4-digit UK SIC level, when available, and at 2-digit 
level otherwise. The producer price index (PPI) was used to deflate sales, wages and CAP 
payments, and asset price deflators were used for deflating firm capital.  
To account for inter-industry linkages, which are important for the transmission of the 
CAP expenditure effects from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors, the input-output (I-O) 
shares of the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector in all other sectors were used averaged 
over the 2005-2010 period. Data was obtained from OECD symmetric I-O tables which 
represent a complete picture of the sectoral interdependencies in the UK economy. The shares 
(aka technical coefficients) were used as regression weights to account for the sectoral 
interdependence affecting the transmission of the CAP expenditure effects to the non-farm 
sector firms. It is reasonable to assume that CAP expenditure will have stronger effect on 
12 
 
firms from sectors closely linked to the farm sector. This is captured by the I-O shares - firms 
from sectors with higher I-O shares are treated as more important.  
The empirical analysis is based only on data for SMEs, i.e. enterprises with less than 
250 employees, in FAME. Definition of variables and descriptive statistics calculated from 
the estimated sample of SMEs are reported in Table 3. Average SME characteristics are 
presented by rural and urban locations in Table 4. Generally, there are no important 
differences in summary statistics between rural and urban firms, but rural SMEs are slightly 
larger as measured by employment and smaller in assets, and they face smaller local market 
demand. The cost of employees (and wages) also is lower in rural SMEs. In rural areas, more 
CAP payments are received than in the urban areas as exemplified by the total subsidy and 
the higher share of direct payments. It is noteworthy that our location-based CAP payments 
measure confounds the amount of payments received by individual farms with the size of the 
farm sector at the location considered; nevertheless, such measure suffice our analytical 
purpose.  
- Tables 3 and 4 here ± 
To estimate the impact of CAP payments on the level and growth of employment, 
capturing long- and short-run effects respectively over the period 2008-2014 in 2-year 
intervals, a panel generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator, based on Arellano and 
Bond (1991), and specifically its extension to system GMM by Blundell and Bond (1998), 
was used. The GMM estimator controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity and for potential 
endogeneity of the firm-level explanatory variables. In the estimation, given the firm-level 
dependent variables, the sector-level, regional-level, and the time dummy explanatory 
variables are treated as exogenous. 
 
5 Results 
The estimation results from the SME sample, for two specifications with dependent variables 
log of employment and growth rate of employment respectively capturing long- and short-run 
effects are presented in Table 5.10 As previously mentioned, in the estimations, the I-O shares 
were used to weight each firm-level observation, while the observations are also clustered at 
constituent-country level to account for the policy environment and structural factors in each 
                                                          
10
 We have run the same set of estimations on the full sample of firms (large and SMEs), and the results 
obtained are qualitatively similar to the ones reported. 
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country.11 The estimated coefficients of all theoretically motivated control variables as per 
equation (8) are significant and have the expected signs. There is no evidence of second-order 
autocorrelation or weak instruments considering the AR(2) and Hansen-J tests respectively.  
- Table 5 here ± 
The variable in the focus of the analysis ± the CAP payments ± has a statistically 
significant effect on both employment levels and growth rates. While the magnitudes of the 
coefficients, representing elasticity appear small, they are of economic significance. The 
impact of CAP payments on employment levels is 0.016 (Table 5), which means that 
completely removing the CAP payments in the UK would result in 1.6 per cent drop in 
employment in non-farm SMEs from the current level, ceteris paribus (no alternative money 
spent in the UK by new national agricultural policy). Given our framework and considering 
that according to ONS (2015) SMEs employed 15.6 million people in 2015, a drop of 1.6 per 
cent is equivalent to about 250,000 jobs. In terms of employment growth, the estimated 
coefficient of 0.004 implies a drop in annual employment growth of about 0.2 percentage 
points if CAP payments were completely removed. This represents a 20 per cent drop in the 
current annual employment growth rate in non-farm SMEs which was on average just under 1 
per cent in our estimated sample of SMEs. These estimated (direct) effects are likely to be the 
lower bound of the total effects, considering that the aggregate market demand variable may 
be capturing some of the CAP spillovers as well, i.e., some of the employment increase due 
to higher demand is in fact and indirectly driven by the (past) CAP expenditure contribution 
to the shift in demand.  
Besides the effect of total CAP payments on employment levels and growth rates, the 
composition of these payments also has a statistically significant impact. Relative to Pillar 2, 
Pillar 1 payments (CMO and SFP) have a stronger positive statistically significant l effect of 
about 5 per cent on employment level. There are no statistically significant differences in 
payment composition effects on employment growth. The finding that Pilar 1 has a stronger 
impact on employment level than Pillar 2 is interesting and suggests that, although in theory 
decoupled from farm output levels, Pillar 1 payments do in fact affect the supply and demand 
(up- and down-stream) linkages between firms (and industries) which are associated with 
                                                          
11
 Clustering of observations allows for correlation of observations within each constituent country which in turn 
results in robust standard errors estimated. The four constituent countries differ in their implementation and 
administration of the CAP payments as well as there are structural differences in terms of agricultural land rental 
arrangements and proportions. It is noteworthy that the rental patterns are quite homogeneous within a 
constituent country and stable over time; this the country controls do capture important information on the CAP 
payments utilisation.  
14 
 
agriculture. Thus, the SFPs appear to be an important factor driving the CAP payment 
spillover effects on non-farm employment.   
- Table 6 here ± 
In Table 6, the same two specifications as in Table 5 are estimated but augmented 
with an interaction term between the CAP payments and the rural area indicator to identify 
rural-area specific impact on employment. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term in 
the equation for employment level is statistically significant, and its magnitude suggests that 
the long-run impact of CAP payments on employment is in fact concentrated in the rural 
SME sample, considering that the main CAP payment effect loses statistical significance. 
Furthermore, the rural dummy coefficient turns negative and remains significant, suggesting 
that without the CAP payments employment in rural areas would be lower compared to urban 
areas. Again, given our estimation framework and considering that rural SMEs employed 
over 2 million people in 2015 (ONS, 2015) completely removing the CAP payments would 
lead to losing more than 200,000 rural jobs. If indeed these lost jobs are mostly concentrated 
in the rural areas, the negative impact on the rural job market would be significant. In terms 
of employment growth, there is no statistically significant difference in effects between rural 
and urban SMEs.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper aims at filling the gap in the literature concerned with the effects of CAP 
payments to farms on employment in local and general bon-farm economies. Whilst most 
previous studies have focused only on the effect of the CAP on employment in agriculture 
and/or in rural areas, this paper investigates explicitly the inter-sectoral spillovers without 
limiting itself WRWKHERXQGDULHVRIµUXUDO¶. The theoretically founded estimation framework 
developed in this study leads to a firm employment function which is estimated with the 
FAME dataset containing rich firm level information. The estimated sample comprises about 
200,000 firm-year observations and covers all industries in the UK economy. Two 
specifications of the employment function were estimated, with employment level and 
growth rate respectively as dependent variables. The estimated sample consisted of SMEs 
only as these represent the majority of employing private businesses in the UK, particularly 
in rural areas. A distinctive feature of the study is the micro-data approach and the wide 
coverage of all sectors in the economy. 
The CAP has been subject to many criticisms by economists due to its market-
distorting effects, even after the ³decoupling´ of direct payments from farm production 
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levels, and due to the blanket income support to farmers, which attenuates their incentives to 
stay competitive and profitable without substantial public transfers. However, this study has 
found a net positive effect of the CAP payments on non-farm employment, and in particular a 
strong positive effect of the SFPs compared with the RD payments. The interaction between 
CAP and rural areas also exerts a strong positive effect on the level of employment.  
Under an extreme policy scenario in which the CAP payments are completely 
removed without compensating/countervailing measures, the impact on UK employment 
would amount to about 250,000 jobs lost. The statistical significance of an interaction term 
between CAP payments and rural areas suggests that the removal of CAP payments would be 
likely to have rural development implications beyond employment lost, e. g. a further outflow 
of population from rural areas, and in particular of young people wanting jobs outside 
farming. Furthermore, if the extra jobs at firm level supported by the CAP were removed, 
there could also be a negative efficiency effect, due to reduction of the scale of operation 
below the minimum efficient scale for some SMEs; such firms may become unviable in the 
long run.  
A caveat to these results and discussion is that they are based on a partial equilibrium 
ceteris paribus analysis. This suggests that the findings should be interpreted as relevant to 
the question on the impact of CAP subsidy on jobs in the UK within the EU membership 
context rather than Brexit, which would clearly be associated, besides withdrawal from CAP, 
with important changes in WKH8.¶s trade regime and the overall functioning of the economy. 
Furthermore, the results should not be interpreted as an attempt to justify the role of 
SFP type of subsidies as a job creation policy across the EU because there might be other 
non-agricultural labour market policies which could be more efficient in increasing or 
sustaining employment opportunities in non-farm enterprises. Nevertheless, this study sends 
the message that a broader approach is necessary in analysing the implications of the CAP, as 
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Table 1: Indicators of UK farming by constituent country, 2013 
Indicators England Northern 
Ireland 
Scotland Wales 
Total agricultural area 
(million ha) 
9.5 1.0 6.2 1.7 
Number of farms (µ000) 101 24.5 52.7 42.3 
Average farm size (ha) 90 41 106 37 
Crops/grass/ rough grazing 
(% of total agric. area)  
40/44/10 5/78/17 10/24/66 5/68/27 
Less favoured area (%) 17 70 85 81 
Gross output per farm 
(£¶000) 
189.3 78.4 59.6 26.1 
Gross output per ha (£) 2016 1925 507 879 
Net Farm Income (average 
all farm types, £¶000) 
34 13 21 17 




Table 2: CAP payments by funding stream and constituent country¼PLOOLRQ*  
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
UK Total 4337 4327 4433 4417 4299 
Pillar 1 3424 3309 3348 3326 3234 
of which DP 3325 3304 3290 3285 3195 
           CMO 99 5 58 41 39 
Pillar 2 ** 913 1018 1085 1091 1065 
of which 
EAFRD 
512 653 742 752 798 
England Total 2761 2696 2777 2792 2714 
Pillar 1 2199 2099 2146 2126 2048 
of which DP 2100 2094 2088 2085 2009 
           CMO 99 5 58 41 39 
Pillar 2 ** 562 597 631 666 666 
of which 
EAFRD 
348 448 470 532 563 
Wales Total 413 417 426 406 413 
Pillar 1 DP 316 312 309 309 301 
Pillar 2 ** 97 105 117 97 112 
of which 
EAFRD 
38 45 54 48 54 
Scotland Total 779 826 840 819 757 
Pillar 1 DP 589 583 584 583 566 
Pillar 2 ** 190 243 256 236 191 
of which 
EAFRD 
92 123 167 113 119 
Northern 
Ireland Total 
384 388 390 400 415 
Pillar 1 DP 320 315 309 308 319 
Pillar 2 ** 64 73 81 92 96 
of which 
EAFRD 
34 37 51 59 62 
Source: Agriculture in the United Kingdom (2014). 
Notes: DP ± Direct Payments; CMO ± Common Market Organisation; EAFRD ± European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. * Annual data is for the EU financial year 16th 
October ± 15th October. ** The difference between the total Pillar 2 and the amount received 




Table 3 Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean (S.D.) 
Employment Number of full-time equivalent firm workers, log 3.07 (1.50) 
Employment growth Growth rate of firm employment 0.01 (0.23) 
Market demand Annual 2-digit SIC by TTWA aggregated 
demand in thousands GBP, log 
13.83 (3.41) 
Demand variance Firm revenue deviation from 2-digit SIC 
geometric mean 
0.99 (2.11) 
Cost per employee Annual firm wage bill per FTE worker in 
thousands GBP, log 
2.99 (1.24) 
Firm size Value of firm total assets in thousands GBP, log 7.18 (2.60) 
Firm age Firm age in years 17.98 (17.93) 
Total subsidy  Value of total CAP subsidies (Pillars 1 and 2) at 
4-digit postcode district in thousands GBP, log 
8.78 (1.79) 
CMO share Share of common market organisation (CMO) 
subsidy, Pillar 1 
0.04 (0.11) 
DP share Share of direct payments (DP) aka SFP, Pillar 1 0.67 (0.41) 
Pillar 1 share Share of Pillar 1 (CMO+DP) 0.71 (0.39) 
RD share Share of rural development payments (RD), 
Pillar 2 
0.29 (0.39) 
Manufacturing Dummy for manufacturing industries 0.12 (0.33) 
Construction Dummy for construction and utilities industries 0.09 (0.28) 
Services Dummy for service industries 0.79 (0.41) 
Rural area Dummy for rural areas according to the DEFRA 
(wider) definition of rurality 
0.17 (0.38) 




Table 4 Summary statistics for rural and urban samples of SME firms 
Variable Rural mean (S.D.) Urban mean (S.D.) 
Employment 3.09 (1.55) 3.06 (1.49) 
Employment growth 0.01 (0.20) 0.01 (0.23) 
Market demand 11.84 (3.40) 14.24 (3.26) 
Demand variance 0.81 (2.06) 1.03 (2.12) 
Cost per employee 2.82 (1.21) 3.03 (1.24) 
Firm size 7.12 (2.61) 7.19 (2.59) 
Firm age 18.65 (17.97) 17.85 (17.92) 
Total subsidy  9.08 (1.79) 8.71 (1.78) 
CMO share 0.02 (0.09) 0.04 (0.12) 
DP share 0.76 (0.34) 0.66 (0.42) 
Pillar 1 share 0.78 (0.33) 0.70 (0.40) 
RD share 0.22 (0.33) 0.30 (0.40) 
Manufacturing 0.16 (0.36) 0.12 (0.32) 
Construction 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) 
Services 0.74 (0.44) 0.80 (0.40) 




Table 5 Regression results for the full SMEs sample 
Dependent variable ln(empl) ¨(empl) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
Market demand 0.114 (0.015)** 0.096 (0.006)** 
Demand variance -0.215 (0.074)** -0.303 (0.023)** 
Cost per employee -0.222 (0.087)** -0.749 (0.154)** 
Firm size 0.093 (0.018)** -0.024 (0.010)** 
Firm age 0.022 (0.004)** 0.010 (0.002)** 
Total subsidy  0.016 (0.005)** 0.004 (0.001)** 
Pillar 1 share 0.048 (0.010)** 0.007 (0.010) 
Rural area 0.105 (0.023)** -0.006 (0.018) 
2010 -0.108 (0.006)** -0.025 (0.004)** 
2012 -0.168 (0.008)** -0.013 (0.010) 
2014 -0.185 (0.008)** -0.006 (0.008) 
Number of observations 190,348 190,348 
AR(2), p-value 0.16 0.06 
Hansen J, p-value 0.99 0.99 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; level of significance ** 1%, * 5%. 





Table 6 Regression results for the full SMEs sample with rural-subsidy interaction 
Dependent variable ln(empl) ¨(empl) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
Market demand 0.111 (0.013)** 0.097 (0.006)** 
Demand variance -0.215 (0.074)** -0.305 (0.024)** 
Cost per employee -0.198 (0.097)* -0.752 (0.150)** 
Firm size 0.096 (0.020)** -0.023 (0.011)* 
Firm age 0.021 (0.005)** 0.010 (0.002)** 
Total subsidy  0.011 (0.018) 0.002 (0.001)* 
Pillar 1 share 0.044 (0.008)** 0.009 (0.010) 
Total subsidy*Rural area 0.120 (0.060)* 0.037 (0.037) 
Rural area dummy -0.386 (0.163)* -0.032 (0.033) 
2010 dummy -0.111 (0.009)** -0.024 (0.004)** 
2012 dummy -0.170 (0.010)** -0.012 (0.010) 
2014 dummy -0.183 (0.008)** -0.007 (0.008) 
Number of observations 190,348 190,348 
AR(2), p-value 0.05 0.06 
Hansen J, p-value 0.99 0.99 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; level of significance ** 1%, * 5%. 
















Figure 2 Geographic distribution of annual CAP payments 
